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Non-technical summary
In many situations, applicants compete for a limited number of positions, and selection
is based on perceived skill or talent, for example in hiring and promotion procedures or
in nominations of election candidates by political parties.
Our paper provides a theory of agents’ effort incentives in such situations and tests the
predictions of this theory versus alternative theories by means of a quasi-experiment in
professional soccer. Our theory introduces signal jamming as in career concerns models in
rank-order tournaments, allowing for asymmetries between agents. We show that incen-
tives are strongest in close contests, i.e., when several agents have similar ex ante winning
probabilities. Moreover, the accuracy of the nomination committee’s information about a
candidate’s ability at the beginning of the selection process may also affect her incentives.
As we show, the predicted relation between a candidate’s optimal effort and the precision
of the information the decision-maker has about her is non-monotonic.
We test these predictions using a panel data set on the German Soccer League in the
seasons 2006/07 and 2007/08. A subset of players belong to nations that qualified for the
Euro Cup in summer 2008, the most prestigious international soccer Cup alongside the
World Cup, and thus participated in the nomination contest.
We find a large positive effect of nomination contest participation on several output mea-
sures, for example the number of shots on the goal, for players with intermediate chances
of being nominated. For players whose nominations chances are very high, however, the
effect of contest participation is negative. That means that players whose uncertainty over
their (non-)nomination is highest will exert the most effort in order to positively influence
the decision of being nominated. Players who are certain of (not) being nominated do
not have any incentive to exert extra effort since it will have no impact on the decision.
Much rather do these players reduce effort in club games in order to avoid injuries that
may jeopardize their Euro Cup participation.
Finally, by showing that younger players react more strongly to their countries’ Euro Cup
qualifications, we provide evidence consistent with career concerns. That is, participating
in a Euro Cup has much higher relevance to the career prospects of a younger player than
to those of a players who is at the very end of his career.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
In vielen Situationen konkurrieren mehrere Bewerber um eine begrenzte Anzahl an Posi-
tionen und die Auswahl wird aufgrund von wahrgenommenem Ko¨nnen oder Talent getrof-
fen. Diese ko¨nnen zum Beispiel Bewerbungsverfahren, interne Befo¨rderungen, oder auch
die Nominierung eines zur Wahl anzutretenden Kandidaten einer politischen Partei sein.
Unser Papier entwickelt eine theoretische Erkla¨rung fu¨r die Anreize von Agenten in solchen
Situationen und testet die implizierten Schlussfolgerungen dieser Theorie gegenu¨ber an-
deren Theorien anhand eines Quasi-Experiments aus dem professionellen Fussball. Unsere
Theorie erweitert die Theorie zu Turnieren durch das Einfu¨hren von signal jamming, wie
in career concerns-Modellen, und das Zulassen von Asymmetrien zwischen Agenten. Wir
zeigen, dass die Anreize am sta¨rksten fu¨r ex-ante ebenbu¨rtige Wettbewerberinnen sind.
Daru¨ber hinaus kann die Genauigkeit der Information des Nominierungsausschusses u¨ber
die Management-Fa¨higkeiten der Kandidatin zu Beginn des Auswahlprozesses auch ihre
Anreize beeinflussen. Wir zeigen, dass die vom theoretischen Modell implizierte Beziehung
zwischen der optimalen Anstrengung der Kandidatin und der Pra¨zision der Information,
die der Entscheidungstra¨ger u¨ber sie hat, nicht-monoton ist.
Wir testen diese theoretischen Implikationen anhand eines Panel-Datensatzes u¨ber die
Saisons 2006/2007 und 2007/2008 der deutschen Fussball-Bundesliga. Ein Teil der Spieler
geho¨rt Nationen an, deren Nationalmannschaften sich fr die Fussball-Europameisterschaft
2008 qualifizierten, und nahmen dadurch am Nominierungswettbewerb teil.
Wir finden einen stark positiven Effekt auf verschiedene Leistungsmaße, zum Beispiel
Torschu¨sse, fu¨r Teilnehmer am Nominierungswettbewerb mit mittleren Nominierungs-
wahrscheinlichkeiten. Fu¨r Spieler, deren Nominierungswahrscheinlichkeiten sehr hoch
sind, finden wir dagegen einen negativen Effekt des Nominierungswettbewerbs. Dass
heißt, dass Spieler, deren Unsicherheit u¨ber ihre (Nicht-)Nominierung am ho¨chsten ist, am
meisten Anstrengung aufbringen, eben diese Nominierungsentscheidung positiv zu beein-
flussen. Spieler, die sich ihrer (Nicht-)Nominierung sicher sind, haben dagegen kaum An-
reize sich u¨berdurchschnittlich anzustrengen, da sie die Entscheidung kaum beeinflussen
ko¨nnen. Viel mehr halten sich Spieler, deren Nominierung sicher ist, eher zuru¨ck um
Verletzungen zu vermeiden und damit ihre Euro-Teilnahme nicht zu gefa¨hrden.
Ausserdem zeigen wir, dass junge Spieler sta¨rker auf die Euro-Qualifikation ihrer National-
mannschaft reagieren, und bieten mit career concerns konsistente empirische Evidenz. Die
Bedeutung einer Euro-Teinahme ist fu¨r die Karriere eines jungen Spielers sehr viel ho¨her
als fu¨r die eines Spielers, der am Ende seiner Karriere steht.
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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of contests based on perceived abilities, and pro-
vides evidence for the predictions of this theory using panel data from professional
soccer. We examine how soccer players perform in club matches during the (in-
formal) nomination contests for national teams prior to an important international
Cup, the Euro 2008. Our differences-in-differences analysis uses players from non-
qualified nations who play in the same league as a control group. We find a large
positive effect of nomination contest participation on several output measures for
players with intermediate chances of being nominated, as proxied by past national
team participations. For players with no prior national team experience there is no
significant effect. We also find support for the theory that players whose nomination
is close to certain reduce their effort in order to avoid injuries or exhaustion prior
to the Cup. Finally, any positive reaction is strongest for young players.
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1 Introduction
Imagine an outsider vacancy occurs on the board of directors of a major corporation. The
board typically sets up a nomination committee in this case, whose task is to identify,
investigate, and evaluate candidates.1 (Ideally) the committee’s goal is to select the most
able of all available outside managers. The difficulty the committee faces in making
this decision is that managerial ability is not directly observable and hard to measure.
Any observable performance measure, e.g., the stock market performance of the company
the manager runs, is bound to be a noisy signal of the manager’s ability: unobservable
managerial effort, unobservable outside factors, and luck all affect company performance.
To form opinions about the potential candidates’ abilities, the committee will combine
information about candidates’ qualifications and past achievements with data on their
performances between the day the vacancy occurs and the final decision. Kaplan and
Reishus (1990) provide evidence that top executive of companies that recently performed
well are more likely to receive additional outside directorships.2 The unobservability of
managerial effort and the fact that current performance may influence the committee’s
decision imply that managers who are aware of being possible candidates for the lucrative
directorship may attempt to improve their chances by ”jamming” the signal about their
ability that the committee observes.3 In particular, a manager may find it profitable to
increase her unobservable effort during what we will call the nomination period in order
to improve her company’s performance and thereby her perceived ability.
A candidate’s incentives to do so may however critically depend on her nomination
chance. Economic theory predicts that a candidate should exert high effort in a close
race, i.e., if she expects to have a realistic chance of being nominated but is not too
confident either. A candidate who expects to be nominated with a very high or a very
low probability, on the other hand, may not have much incentive to change her behavior,
since any improvement in her observed performance in unlikely to affect the final outcome.
We derive these insights in a situation where decision are based on perceived abilities,4
1Formally, decision rights rest with the shareholders. In practice, however, shareholders almost always
vote for the proposed candidate or slate. See Hermalin and Weisbach (1998).
2Kaplan and Reishus (1990) use dividend-cuts and industry-adjusted stock returns as performance
measures. They also report that more than 80% of Fortune 500 managers hold either none, one, or two
outside directorships, which suggests that an additional directorship is an important event for a manager.
3The term signal jamming goes back to Holmstro¨m (1982) who analyzes the dynamic career concerns
of a single worker.
4Ho¨ffler and Sliwka (2003) derive the same result under the assumption that the precision of the
1
but the relationship between ex ante winning chances and effort incentives is qualitatively
similar in rank-order tournaments where observed performances rather than perceived
abilities determine payoffs (Lazear and Rosen (1981), Meyer (1992), Baik (1994)), or if a
single agent competed against a fixed standard.
The main difference with respect to tournaments based on observed performances is
that the accuracy of the nomination committee’s information about a candidate’s ability
at the beginning of the selection process may also affect her incentives now. As we
show, the predicted relation between a candidate’s optimal effort and the precision of
the information the decision-maker has about her is non-monotonic. If the committee
already has a very clear idea of the manager’s qualification for the post, incentive are
weak because any change in her performance is unlikely to affect the final decision.5
Moreover, a candidate’s incentives will also be weak when only little is know about her
ability: due to the high variance of beliefs in this case, it is unlikely that the perceived
ability of the candidate will lie close to that of one of the other candidates at the end of
the nomination period. Thus, an increase in effort is unlikely to affect the final decision
even if the agent’s observed current performance could have a strong effect on perceptions
about her ability.
Similar incentives arise in other situations where several applicants compete for a
limited number of positions, and selection is based on perceived skill or talent, in particular
other hiring or promotion procedures,6 or nominations of election candidates by political
parties.
This paper provides a theory of agents’ incentives in such situations and tests the
predictions of this theory versus alternative theories by means of a quasi-experiment in
professional soccer. When a nation qualifies for a major international tournament, such as
the Soccer Euro Cup, the national coach is responsible for selecting the players who will
be on the national team that plays in the Cup.7 Our theory then predicts that players who
decision-maker’s information about all agents is identical.
5The intuition for this result goes back to the career concerns literature, building on Holmstro¨m (1982),
where uncertainty about the agent’s skill is necessary for him or her to find it profitable to exert effort.
6In firms, an interesting tension may arise between two possible goals of hiring and promotion systems:
motivating internal agents by the prospect of a future promotion, and selecting the most promising
candidate out of a pool of both internal and external candidates. Chan (1996) analyzes this conflict. In
the example we consider no such tension arises, since the principal cannot contract with the agents prior
to the nomination decision.
7National team composition is flexible in friendly matches between nations or qualification matches
for international Cups, but not for Cups.
2
expect they have a chance of being nominated by the national coach, but about whose skill
the national coach has less then perfect information, should increase their effort during
the nomination period so as to jam the signal the national coach will receive about their
ability. We would therefore expect that the performances of these players in club matches
should improve (relative to their colleagues) during the ”nomination season”.
We test this prediction using a panel dataset on the German Soccer League (1. Bun-
desliga) in the seasons 2006/07 and 2007/08. A subset of players belong to nations that in
summer 2008 participated in the Euro Cup, the most prestigious international soccer Cup
alongside the World Cup.8 The national team coaches announced which players would
participate in the so-called Euro 2008 at the end of the 07/08 season. In our differences-
in-differences analysis, the treatment group consists of all players who are nationals of a
country qualified for the Euro 2008, and the treatment period is taken to start on the day
the player’s nation qualified. In players from nations that do not participate in the Euro
2008 we have an exceptionally good control group, since these players work in exactly the
same environment as players from qualified nations but do not face the additional career
opportunity of the upcoming Cup.
Our data contain a variety of individual output measures, such as goals, shots on
goal, duels won, passes received, and cross passes, as well as player substitutions during
the game. In addition, data are available to control for several factors that should affect
performance, such as whether the match takes place ‘at home’, the player’s field position
in a match, the player’s current club, and the opponent team. Further controlling for
constant quality differences between players, we find only weak evidence for a positive
average impact of Euro Cup qualification on individual output. A likely cause for the
absence of a strong average effect is that only a subset of players in the treatment group
have a realistic chance of being nominated for their national teams.
To distinguish between players with different nomination chances, we construct a time-
varying variable measuring a player’s recent national team exposure, equal to the num-
ber of the player’s national team participations divided by the total number of national
team matches, both counted since the 2006 World Cup. A differences-in-differences-in-
differences analysis using this variable shows that the impact of the Euro Cup treatment
8The Euro Cup and the World Cup each take place every four years. The last World Cup was in 2006.
There are some other international cups, such as the Copa America or the Africa Cup of Nations, but
these are not close to being as important (in terms of media coverage, premia paid by national teams,
etc.) as the Euro and the World Cup.
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is strongest (and positive) for players with an intermediate nomination chance, which is
consistent with our nomination contest theory. Moreover, our results also lend support
to what we call the ‘injury theory’: for several output measures, the effect of nomination
contest participation is negative for players with an expected nomination probability close
to one. This makes sense given that professional soccer carries a high injury risk, which
can be reduced by a more passive style of play. This effect should be strongest for top
players, for whom Cup participation is basically a certainty but conditional on avoiding
an injury prior to the Cup. For players with no past national team exposure, we find no
significant impact of the Euro Cup treatment on performance in club matches.
Next, we test for differential effects of the Euro Cup treatment by age, which we in-
terpret as a measure of the accuracy of information national team coaches have about a
player’s skill. Our nomination contest theory predicts that very young players (possibly
younger than any player in the League) should exert less effort than somewhat older play-
ers. Beyond a certain age threshold, however, effort to win the nomination contest should
be lower the older a player. There is another reason to believe that older players will
have lower incentives: the job market aspect of a Euro Cup should be more important for
younger players who are less well-known and have longer careers ahead of them. Again us-
ing a differences-in-differences-in-differences analysis, we find evidence that participation
in a nomination contest affected younger players more strongly than older players. This
is compatible with the nomination contest theory for sufficiently high levels of precision,
but also with predictions based on post Euro Cup career concerns.
Related Literature On the theoretical side, our paper introduces signal jamming as
in Holmstro¨m’s (1982) career concerns model in the theory of rank-order tournaments of
Lazear and Rosen (1981). Ho¨ffler and Sliwka’s (2003) basic model is similar to ours, but
we allow for more asymmetries between agents and derive several additional comparative
statics results that we then test empirically.
The theoretical predictions concerning the relation between anticipated winning prob-
abilities and effort incentives would be the same in tournaments, where relative observed
performances instead of perceived abilities determine payoffs. The empirical literature
on tournaments focuses largely on the impact of higher prizes or prize differentials how-
ever; see Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) as well as Orszag (1994) for evidence from
golf tournaments, Becker and Huselid (1992) for evidence from auto racing, Knoeber and
Thurman (1995) for an examination of the impact of tournament-style contracts in the
4
broiler industry, and Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2005) for evidence on the effects of
higher prize differentials on both creative and destructive effort in soccer.
The only paper we are aware of that provides (indirect) evidence that anticipated
winning chances affect effort is Brown (2008),9 who investigates the impact of superstar
Tiger Woods’ presence in golf tournaments using panel data. Her main result is that Tiger
Woods’ tournament participations had adverse effects on the performances of his competi-
tors. Our paper’s contribution to her study is threefold. First, we are able to construct a
variable capturing each player’s individual national team nomination chance. This allows
us to test predictions concerning the relation between expected winning chances and effort
incentives not only more directly but also more completely than Brown (2008). Second,
we provide evidence in a situation where payoffs depend on perceived abilities, which is
very common in (external and internal) labor markets but has received little attention
in the empirical literature so far. Finally, the institutional characteristic that players of
many different nationalities work for the same clubs but only some nations participate in
the Euro Cup allows us to conduct an analysis akin to a randomized experiment, which
strengthens causal interpretations.1011
The literature testing the predictions of career concerns theory is small. Gibbons and
Murphy (1992) find evidence that the sensitivity of contracted pay to performance for US
executives increases as retirement approaches, which is consistent with optimal incentive
contracting in the presence of career concerns. Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) find that
younger fund managers are more likely to be fired for poor performance than more senior
fund managers, and that younger managers are less likely to take unusual or bold actions.
Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) reach similar conclusions examining security analysts.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) also provide evidence that older managers perform worse
than younger managers. They conclude that ”younger managers are likely to work harder
because they have a longer career ahead of them and because, as we show, they are more
9Sunde (2003) finds a negative correlation between the heterogeneity of opponents and the number of
games in tennis matches. Interpreting these results in terms of effort incentives is problematic, however,
since the same correlation would be expected even if effort played no role in tennis.
10Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath (2008) also exploit the fact that the top soccer teams employ players
of many different nationalities to test whether there is a relation between violence on the soccer field and
cultural background.
11Brown (2008) deals with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity due to superstar Tiger Woods’s
decision to enter only certain tournaments by narrowing the sample to golf courses on which Tiger Woods
has competed in some years only.
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likely to be fired for poor performance”.
By showing that younger players react more strongly to their countries’ Euro Cup
qualifications, we provide additional evidence consistent with career concerns. Impor-
tantly, the situation we consider allows us to compare not only young and old players, but
also players of the same age in the treatment and the control group. This adds confidence
to the conclusion that findings are due to age, and not driven by an unobserved factor
correlated with age (such as systematic differences in educational backgrounds).
The next section develops a theory of nomination contests and derives comparative
statics results that will provide the background for our empirical tests. Section 3 describes
the data, our choice of output measures, and the institutional context. Section 4 explains
and discusses our empirical strategy. Section 5 contains the empirical results, and section
6 concludes.
2 Theory
This section develops a simple model of nomination contests. Suppose that there are
two agents (for example, soccer players of the same nationality) and that exactly one of
them will be selected for an attractive post at the end of the nomination period. The
nomination decision is taken by a principal (the national team coach) whose objective is
to select the most skillful agent. Hence, unlike in a tournament a` la Lazear and Rosen
(1981), it is not the agents’ relative performances but rather the principal’s beliefs about
the agents’ skills that determine which agent wins the contest. The principal’s prior beliefs
about the agents’ skills will have an important impact on expected winning probabilities
and on incentives.
In modeling each agent’s reputation formation we follow Holmstro¨m’s (1982) seminal
paper on career concerns. Let ηj denote agent j’s (j ∈ {1, 2}) skill level, which is assumed
to be fixed. At the beginning of the nomination season, the agents and the principal share
the same prior beliefs about each ηj. Specifically, we assume that the prior of ηj follows a
normal distribution with mean mj and precision (equal to the inverse of the variance) hj.
The prior distributions of η1 and η2 are independent. Over time, learning about ηj will
occur through the observation of j’s performance. For simplicity, we consider learning in
a single time period, called the nomination period. Agent j’s output in the nomination
period is given by
yj = ηj + aj + εj,
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where aj ∈ [0,∞) is j’s effort in the nomination period, unobservable for the principal and
agent k 6= j. εj is a stochastic noise term, and we assume that ε1 and ε2 are independently
and normally distributed with zero means and precision hε.
We focus on the agents’ efforts aimed at winning the nomination contest here, ab-
stracting from the incentives generated by their work contracts and other career con-
cerns. It would be straightforward to integrate this analysis into a richer model. Agent
j 6= k ∈ {1, 2} maximizes
Πj
(
aj; a
e
j , ak, a
e
k
)
= Pj
(
aj; a
e
j , ak, a
e
k
)
Wj − c(aj),
where Pj
(
aj; a
e
j , ak, a
e
k
)
is the probability of j’s nomination as a function of j’s anticipated
effort aej as well as k’s actual and anticipated effort levels ak and a
e
k. c (·) : R+0 → R+0 is
an increasing and strictly convex function measuring the disutility of effort. We treat Wj
as exogenous here, but at the end of this section we will discuss ways in which Wj may
be expected to depend on j’s characteristics, in particular hj.
The principal’s objective is to nominate the most skillful agent; after observing y1 and
y2 he will hence select j if and only if
12
E[ηj | yj] > E[ηk | yk]. (1)
Denote by (a∗1, a
∗
2) the equilibrium effort choices. In equilibrium, each agent’s effort
choice must be optimal given the other agent’s effort choice and beliefs, and the principal
must correctly anticipate effort choices, i.e., aej = a
∗
j for j = 1, 2.
Given our normality and independence assumptions, the learning process about each
agent’s skill is well-known. For aej = a
∗
j , the posterior distribution of ηj will be normal
with mean
hjmj + hε(yj − a∗j)
hj + hε
(2)
and precision hj + hε.
Let us now consider j’s effort decision at the beginning of the period. From (2) it
follows that, given ak = a
∗
k, if j chooses aj then he will be nominated with probability
12We implicitly assume here that the principal is risk-neutral, and that the cost of incentive provision
once the agent is nominated, i.e., during the Euro Cup in our soccer example, is unrelated to the agent’s
preceived ability. If h1 = h2, then there exists a biased tournament as in Meyer (1991, 1992) that is
equivalent to the principal’s decision rule. In this biased tournament, the contestant with the lower prior
reputation has to outperform the other agents by a given amount in order to win. For h1 6= h2, the rates
at which the principal updates his beliefs about the agents’ skills as a function of observed outputs differ,
and therefore there is no such direct equivalence.
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Pj(aj; a
∗
j , a
∗
k, a
∗
k) = Pr
{
hjmj + hε(ηj + aj + εj − a∗j)
hj + hε
>
hkmk + hε(ηk + εk)
hk + hε
}
= Pr
{
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j) >
hkmk + hε(ηk + εk)
hk + hε
− hjmj + hε(ηj + εj)
hj + hε
}
.
Define the random variable
ζj ≡ hkmk + hε(ηk + εk)
hk + hε
− hjmj + hε(ηj + εj)
hj + hε
.
Our independence and normality assumptions imply that the prior distribution of ζj is
normal with mean
zj ≡ mk −mj (3)
and variance13
σ2 ≡
(
hε
hk + hε
)2(
1
hk
+
1
hε
)
+
(
hε
hj + hε
)2(
1
hj
+
1
hε
)
(4)
We denote this distribution by ϕj (·) with c.d.f. φj (·). The probability of j’s nomination
given ak = a
∗
k is then
Pj(aj; a
∗
j , a
∗
k, a
∗
k) = Pr
{
ζj <
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j)
}
= φj
(
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j)
)
. (5)
The marginal impact of aj on j
′s expected payoff given ak = a∗k is
∂Πj(aj; a
∗
j , a
∗
k, a
∗
k)
∂aj
= ϕj
(
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j)
)
hε
hj + hε
Wj − c′ (ai) .
Note that if c′ (0) ≥ ϕj (0) hεhj+hεWj, then a∗j = 0.14
The first-order conditions for an equilibrium with a∗1, a
∗
2 > 0 are
c′ (a∗1) = ϕ1 (0)
hε
h1 + hε
W1, (6)
c′ (a∗2) = ϕ2 (0)
hε
h2 + hε
W2. (7)
Note that each of these conditions is a function of only one of the effort levels: in equi-
librium the principal correctly anticipates effort levels, which implies that given k indeed
chooses a∗k, j’s nomination probability is independent of the level of a
∗
k. Our assumptions
13Since the prior distributions of ζ1 and ζ2 have the same variance, we can simply denote this variance
by σ2, not using any subscript.
14Since aj is j’s effort additional to the effort he would have exerted in the absence of the nomination
contest, it may well be that c′ (0) > 0.
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on c (·) imply that if c′ (0) < ϕj (0) hεhj+hεWj for j = 1, 2, then each first-order condition
has a unique and positive solution.15 Note also that if h1 = h2 and W1 = W2, then
a∗1 = a
∗
2.
Assuming from now onwards that an interior equilibrium indeed exists, we are inter-
ested in the comparative statics of the equilibrium effort levels with respect to the model
parameters. Evidently,
da∗j
dWj
> 0: the higher the prize of wining the nomination contest,
the higher the incentive to provide effort. With respect to the parameters characterizing
the prior belief distributions, we obtain the following results (the proof is relegated to the
appendix):
Proposition 1 (i) For every j 6= k ∈ {1, 2}, a∗j depends on ∆ = |m1 −m2| but not on
m1 and m2 individually, and
da∗j
d∆
< 0 if ∆ > 0,
da∗j
d∆
= 0 if ∆ = 0.
(ii) Given (mj,mk, hk, hε), there exists for every j 6= k ∈ {1, 2} a threshold ĥj > 0
such that
da∗j
dhj
T 0 if and only if hj S ĥj.
Similarly, given (mj,mk, hj, hε) there exists for every j 6= k ∈ {1, 2} a threshold ĥk > ĥj
such that
da∗j
dhk
T 0 if and only if hk S ĥk.
Moreover, limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
=∞, and limhj→∞a∗j = 0.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how a∗1 varies with m1 and h1, respectively, in an example.
The intuition for part (i) of the Proposition is straightforward. Ceteris paribus a smaller
difference ∆ between the mean prior reputations means that the race is closer in terms of
the expected winning probabilities being more equal. For each agent, a small increase in
effort is then more likely to affect the contest outcome and therefore more attractive.
15The second-order equilibrium conditions are
ϕ′j (0)
(
hε
hj + hε
)2
Wj < c
′′ (a∗j) for all j 6= k ∈ {1, 2} .
If mj = mk, then ϕ′j (0) = 0 for j = 1, 2, so the second-order conditions always hold in that case. In
what follows, we will assume that the second-order conditions are always satisfied.
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Figure 1: 1’s equilibrium effort if c(a) = a
2
2
, m2 = 1, h1 = 1, h2 = 2, hε = 1,W1 = 10.
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Figure 2: 1’s equilibrium effort if c(a) = a
2
2
,m1 = m2 = 1, h2 = 2, hε = 1,W1 = 10.
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The intuition for (ii) is more involved. An increase in the precision hj of the prior
distribution of beliefs about ηj has two effects on the first-order condition that determines
a∗j (conditions (6) and (7), respectively). First, it lowers the rate
hε
hj+hε
at which a marginal
increase in yj−a∗j , and hence a marginal increase in aj given anticipated effort a∗j , improves
j’s posterior reputation as given in (2). This is a standard effect in learning models, which
ceteris paribus predicts that higher precision leads to less effort. Second, an increase in
hj makes the distribution ϕj (·) more precise and thereby also affects ϕj (0), the (prior)
density of identical posterior reputations; ϕj (0) captures the anticipated probability that
the contest will have a close outcome at the end of the nomination period. Since a marginal
change in effort is more likely to alter the contest outcome if posterior reputations are
similar with a higher probability, any increase in ϕj (0) raises effort incentives. A priori
the sign of this second effect is ambiguous however. If prior reputations are identical
(∆ = 0), then ϕj (0) is the density at the mean zj = 0, which indeed rises as (the normal
distribution) ϕj becomes more precise.
16 For ∆ > 0, the sign of the second effect depends
on the size of the difference between the prior reputations relative to the variance σ2
of ϕj. If mk and mj are sufficiently close given σ
2, or σ2 is sufficiently large given ∆,
then the sign of the second effect is positive; otherwise it is negative. Since ∂σ
2
∂hj
< 0 and
limhj→0 σ
2 = ∞, the effect is always positive for hj sufficiently close to 0; it also always
dominates the first effect in this case. For large enough hj, however, the first effect always
dominates, as the rate of updating approaches zero.
Ho¨ffler and Sliwka (2003) use a similar model to analyze the incentives of a firm owner
to replace an incumbent manager by someone with less information about the agents’
past performances. The manager’s task is to select the most skillful of two agents for a
promotion at the end of every period. Replacing the manager can increase the agents’
effort incentives by starting a fresh race for the valuable promotion. Unlike the analysis
presented in this section, Ho¨ffler and Sliwka (2003) do not allow for heterogeneity in the
levels of precision of the prior distributions about agents’ skills, nor do they any derive
comparative statics results with respect to these parameters.
So far we treated the nomination prize Wi as an exogenous parameter in order to
16Rosen (1986) identifies a similar effect in ladder tournaments, where winning probabilities at each
stage are a given function of talents and effort levels, and players form opinions about their own and their
opponents’ talents. In equilibrium the prior reputations of two players meeting for a match are always
identical. When there are only two possible talent levels, the marginal effect of effort on winning is then
increasing in the precision with which players assess their talents.
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Figure 3: Timeline
simplify the analysis and focus on the rivalry between agents for nomination, but it makes
sense to think ofWi as a function of i’s reputation. In the nomination contests for national
Euro Cup soccer teams that we will analyze, Wj includes the expected monetary (premia
for cup participation, possible endorsement revenues, improved career prospects) and non-
monetary (honor and fame) returns from participation in a prestigious international Cup.
One would expect the following relationships due to post Cup career concerns. First, the
higher the prior precision hi (and hence also the posterior precision, hi + hε), the lower
Wi. An international Cup is likely to make the biggest difference in terms of future career
prospects for players about whose ability the market is still rather uncertain. Related to
this, hi is also likely correlated with the seniority of a player, which means that players
with low hi typically also have a longer career ahead of them and therefore more to gain
from Cup participation. Second, a superstar, i.e., a player with a very high reputation
relative to other players, may not have as much to gain as less famous players. Last, in a
model with more than two agents one would expect Wi to depend more explicitly on i’s
rank within the set of nominated players. In national soccer teams, the ”last” players to
be nominated are likely to spend most or even all of their time in reserve, and hence have
few opportunities to shine.
3 Data and Institutional Characteristics
3.1 Euro 2008 qualifications and player nominations
Our empirical analysis focuses on the time period between the end of the World Cup 2006
on July 9, 2006, and the end of the 2007/08 soccer season on May 17, 2008. As illustrated
by the timeline in Figure 3, the qualification matches for the Euro 2008 started shortly af-
ter the World Cup. All eligible nations, fifty in total for the Euro 2008, usually participate
12
in the qualification matches. The sixteen participating countries were officially announced
on November 21, 2007, but several countries already de facto qualified before that date.
Using the outcomes of the qualification matches, we found the de facto qualification dates
for all Euro Cup participants; a group of four countries (Germany, Greece, Romania and
the Czech Republic) qualified about one month before the official date, on either the 13th
or 17th of October, while ten other nations qualified on the 17th or 21st of November.
The two remaining participants were Austria and Switzerland, the host nations, which
traditionally participate automatically. We exclude players with citizenship of these two
countries from the empirical analysis.
National coaches can select different players for every non-Cup national match if they
wish to do so, and as we will document there is indeed considerable variation over time in
national team compositions for non-Cup matches. The coaches have to nominate a fixed
team of 23 players for the Cup, however. The deadline for the coaches’ announcements of
their Euro 2008 teams was May 28, 2008, eleven days after the end of the German soccer
season. There were some differences between qualified countries regarding the date and
procedures according to which national coaches announced their nomination decisions,
but most coaches made their final statements either between the last but one and the
last, or after the last game day of the season.
A number of other international tournaments took place in the relevant time period:
the Copa America in July 2007, the Africa Cup of Nations in January 2008, and the
2008 Olympic games in August 2008. These Cups could potentially interfere with our
analysis by creating similar incentives as the Euro 2008 but for different groups of players.
However, in soccer these other international tournaments are much less important in terms
of media coverage and endorsement opportunities than Euro Cups, and some clubs do not
even allow their players to miss club activities in order to participate.17 Formally testing
for an incentive effect of the Copa America, using the same empirical strategy as described
below for the Euro 2008, we found no evidence of such an effect whatsoever. We therefore
feel that it is safe to ignore these other international Cups in the analysis.
17For example, Bundesliga clubs Schalke 04 and Werder Bremen clashed with the Brazilian national
team over the participation of their players in the 2008 Olympic games. Similarly, Guy Demel of Ham-
burger SV forwent playing for his home country Ivory Coast in the Africa Cup of Nations in 2008 to
have more time available for his club.
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3.2 Data and output measurement
We use a panel dataset that contains player-game day level information on the German
Soccer League (1. Bundesliga) in the seasons 2006/07 and 2007/08.18 For each of the
216 matches in each season, we have information about all players who participated in
the match - either on the field or on the reserve bench -, and about various dimensions
of their performances. In addition, we gathered data on national team matches of the
same players between the World Cup 2006 and the Euro 2008 using publicly available
sources;19 the latter data we used exclusively for constructing a variable summarizing a
player’s past national team exposure.
We keep only those players in the dataset for whom we have observations in the
German Soccer League both before and after the official Euro 2008 qualification date in
November 2007, and in Season 06/07, and who were on the field at least once in the two
seasons. Moreover, we exclude goalkeepers as they have very different tasks than field
players, and most of the performance measures we will use are not applicable to them.
Table 1 provides an overview of the players’ nationalities. The treatment group ”Euro
2008” consists of all players whose nations participated in the Euro 2008 (except for those
of Austrian or Swiss nationality), and the control group consists of all other players. About
half the players are of German nationality, but the others originate from all over the world.
Incidentally, the German Soccer League was the best represented in the Euro 2008, with
active players in fourteen out of sixteen teams. Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics
for players from participating and non-participating nations, respectively; all statistics
refer to club matches in the German League. On average Euro 2008 - Europeans are
younger, occupy midfield positions more frequently, and have lower outputs than players
in the control group. Several of these comparison would be reversed if Germans were
excluded from the sample.
We think of unobservable effort as choices such as training intensity and lifestyle
(nutrition, sleeping habits,...), as well as concentration and motivation on the soccer field.
To measure observable individual output, we rely on the following measures:20
18The data was kindly provided by Impire, a company specialized in collecting and selling sports data.
19We relied on the following websites: ESPNsoccernet.com, FIFA.com, Kicker.de, and Worldfoot-
ball.net.
20In addition, we also have information on the fouls committed and suffered by each player. Fouls
suffered could be interpreted as a positive performance measure, the idea being that stronger players are
harder to stop. Fouls committed can be viewed as a measure of destructive effort. This is the approach
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Table 1: Number of players by nationality
Group Nationality Players
Euro 2008
Czech Republic 8
Croatia 7
France 3
Germany 121
Greece 3
Netherlands 5
Poland 7
Portugal 3
Romania 2
Russia 1
Sweden 2
Turkey 3
All Euro 2008 165
non-Euro 2008
Albania 2
Algeria 1
Argentinia 5
Australia 2
Belgium 3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3
Brazil 17
Cameroon 2
Canada 1
China 1
Congo DR 1
Denmark 7
Egypt 1
Finland 1
Georgia 1
Ghana 3
Guinea 1
Hungary 2
Iran 2
Ivory Coast 3
Japan 1
Macedonia 2
Mexico 2
Namibia 1
Nigeria 1
Paraguay 2
Peru 1
Serbia 3
Slovakia 3
South Africa 1
Tunesia 2
Uruguay 2
USA 1
All non-Euro 2008 81
All players 246
Notes: The sample excludes goalkeepers, players of Austrian or Swiss na-
tionality, or players for whom we have observations in one season only or
only either after or before the official Euro 2008 qualification date.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for players from nations participating in the Euro 2008
(number of players = 165)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Age 26.866 4.021 19.43 38.58 7875
Forward (dummy) 0.351 0.477 0 1 7875
Midfield (dummy) 0.465 0.498 0 1 7875
Minutes played 61.952 36.902 0 96 7875
Goals 0.096 0.329 0 4 7875
Goals per minute played 0.001 0.006 0 0.13 6603
Shots on goal 1.000 1.387 0 10 7875
Shots on goal per minute played 0.017 0.024 0 0.33 6603
Passes received 19.105 15.097 0 83 7875
Passes received per minute played 0.308 0.153 0 1.33 6603
Ball contacts 38.427 26.783 0 132 7875
Ball contacts per minute played 0.612 0.206 0 2 6603
Duels won 8.326 6.230 0 33 7875
Duels won per minute played 0.135 0.071 0 1 6603
Cross passes 0.860 1.384 0 12 7875
Cross passes per minute played 0.014 0.023 0 0.33 6603
Fouls suffered 1.129 1.430 0 10 7875
Fouls suffered per minute played 0.018 0.023 0 0.33 6603
Fouls committed 1.150 1.364 0 11 7875
Fouls committed per minute played 0.019 0.023 0 0.5 6603
Notes: The sample excludes goalkeepers, players of Austrian or Swiss nationality, or
players for whom we have observations in one season only or only either after or before
the official Euro 2008 qualification date. Output per minutes measures are calculated
using only observations associated with a positive number of minutes on the field.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for players from nations not participating in the
Euro 2008 (number of players = 81)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Age 28.691 3.352 19.90 36.69 3946
Forward (dummy) 0.390 0.488 0 1 3946
Midfield (dummy) 0.403 0.491 0 1 3946
Minutes played 64.733 35.117 0 96 3946
Goals 0.100 0.334 0 3 3946
Goals per minute played 0.002 0.008 0 0.25 3450
Shots on goal 1.056 1.389 0 9 3946
Shots on goal per minute played 0.018 0.026 0 0.5 3450
Passes received 20.427 15.283 0 85 3946
Passes received per minute played 0.313 0.150 0 1.06 3450
Ball contacts 41.261 26.936 0 130 3946
Ball contacts per minute played 0.626 0.208 0 1.6 3450
Duels won 8.986 6.107 0 34 3946
Duels won per minute played 0.140 0.073 0 2 3450
Cross passes 0.841 1.378 0 11 3946
Cross passes per minute played 0.014 0.023 0 0.5 3450
Fouls suffered 1.291 1.521 0 11 3946
Fouls suffered per minute played 0.020 0.024 0 0.5 3450
Fouls committed 1.297 1.401 0 10 3946
Fouls committed per minute played 0.021 0.030 0 1 3450
Notes: The sample excludes goalkeepers, players of Austrian or Swiss nationality,
or players for whom we have observations in one season only or only either after
or before the official Euro 2008 qualification date. Output per minutes measures
are calculated using all observations associated with a positive number of minutes
on the field.
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Goals - The ultimate objective of a soccer team is to shoot goals and prevent goals by
the opponent so as to win the match. Goals are a good measure of individual output for
forward players in particular.
Shots on goal - This output measure includes goals, but also shots kicked at the
opponent’s goal that were eventually blocked by an opponent, a teammate, the goal post
or crossbar. The advantage of shots on goal as an output measure compared to goals is
that they occur at a much higher frequency, and are less subject to luck. Shots on goal
are again most pertinent as an output measure for forward players.
Passes received - This measure counts the number of passes a player receives from his
teammates. It is a good indicator of how active the player is on the field, which in turn
is related to his fitness, and second, his teammates’ current trust in his ability to make a
valuable contribution to the game.
Ball contacts - Ball contacts is a more aggregate measure than passes received of how
involved a player is, and also reflects a player’s success in obtaining the ball.
Duels won - A duel is a situation where two players fight for the ball in direct con-
frontation. A duel counts as won if the player himself or one of his teammates finally
obtains the ball. Duels won measures physical fitness, and dedication.
Cross passes - Long and usually high pass played from the sidelines intended for
attacking players close to the opponent’s goal. This a measure of running effort and
offensive motivation.
Minutes played - Our data also include detailed information on player substitutions
during a match. The rules of the game specify that the coach can make at most three
substitutions per match, and in the majority of matches coaches make two or three sub-
stitutions, in 80% of cases in the last 30 minutes of a match (total match length is 90
minutes plus a few minutes extra time). It makes sense to view a player’s number of
minutes played as a relevant output measure. First, a player’s performance on the field
will influence the coach’s substitution decisions.21 Second, the club coach’s decision to let
a player be one of players starting the match or stay on the field for a long time depends
taken by Garicano and Palacios-Huertas (2005), who provide empirical evidence for Lazear’s (1989)
prediction that relative performance evaluations can lead to undesirable sabotage. Once we control for
constant differences between players by means of player fixed effects, our regressions show no significant
effects of nomination contest participation on either fouls suffered or fouls committed.
21This implies that an endogeneity problem would arise if we tried to control for the number or minutes
played by using it as an explanatory variable for say a player’s number of shots on goal.
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on the player’s effort and performance during training activities, observable by the club
coach but typically not by the national coach.22
The fact that some players spend much more time on the field than others implies that
comparing total outputs such as number of goals of different players could be misleading.
Not surprisingly, the correlations between some per match output measures and minutes
played reported in Table 4 are strong. A way out of this would be to exclude observa-
tions of players who were substituted (out or in), but in the many matches with three
substitutions this would make us lose 6 out of 14 observations (with field appearance) per
team.
To disentangle the two performance dimensions ‘time spent on the field’ and ‘perfor-
mance while on the field’, our approach will be the following. First, we run regressions
with minutes played as the dependent variable. Second, we run regressions for various
outputs per minute played ; one issue with per minute played measures is however that, as
reported in the lower half of Table 4, for outputs such as shots on goal there is a negative
correlation between output per minute and minutes played. This can be attributed to
physical exhaustion as well as associated energy management strategies. Interestingly,
though, the correlation tends to be positive for output measures more strongly related to
team play. This points to the fact that players need some time to get involved into the
team’s game.
To rule out that our findings are driven by differences in minutes played via such
correlations, we keep only observations associated with at least 71 minutes, the median
substitution time for starters conditional on being substituted out.23 The average number
of shots on goal per minute is about 0.022 for players who play 71 minutes or less, but only
0.014 for players who play more than 71 minutes. The difference between the averages for
players who play more than 71 and those who play more than 90 minutes is very small on
the other hand: 0.014 versus 0.013. By adding the condition that minutes played exceed
the median substitution time for starters, we can hence substantially alleviate the problem
of comparing observations based on appearances of different lengths without losing too
many observations.
22Even famous players may have to work hard to convince the coach to let them play. A point in case
is Lukas Podolski, a star of the German national team during World Cup 2006, who had just five league
starts between August 2007 and September 2008 at the Bayern Mu¨nchen team.
23The results would be very similar if instead we kept only observation of starters. If we adopted the
stricter conditions of no substitutions, some but fewer of our results would be significant.
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4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical analysis investigates the impact of a nation’s qualification for the Euro
2008 on the club match outputs of players from that nation. Assuming for now that the
effect of the Euro treatment is a constant, denoted δ, the basic regression equation we
estimate is:
Yint = γi + αt + δqualifiednt +X
′
intβ + εint, (8)
where Yint is the output of player i of nationality n on game day t. The treatment dummy
qualifiednt equals 1 if and only if nation n is qualified for the Euro 2008 at time t,
and Xint is a vector of covariates. None of the covariates depends directly on a player’s
nationality, so in fact Xint = Xit; it includes a dummy variable indicating whether player
i’s club plays at home or as a visitor on day t, player i’s club on day t, player i’s opponent
club on day t, and player i’s position on game day t.24 The player fixed effects γi pick
up any (time-invariant) differences between players, both before and after the Euro Cup
qualifications decisions.25 The game day dummies αt pick up any changes in conditions
affecting all players in the German league. The coefficient of qualifiednt estimates the
average effect of Euro Cup qualification on the output in club matches of players from
the qualified nations.
The identifying assumption is that in the absence of the Euro Cup treatment, play-
ers from qualified countries and players from non-qualified countries would have evolved
similarly over time (given controls), i.e., that δ = 0 in that case. Since players in the
treatment and the control group work in the same environment and are subject to sim-
ilar incentive systems in the absence of international Cups, we think that there is little
reason to doubt this. A player’s eligibility for the Euro Cup treatment, i.e., his nation’s
participation in the qualifications, is determined exogenously by geography.26 Within the
24It is relatively common for players to move between midfield and forward positions, or between
defense and midfield positions, in different matches.
25The reader may wonder why age is excluded from the list of covariates. This is because in order to
avoid that the age variable picks up a time trend, we use a time-invariant age variable (age on May 17,
2008). In unreported regressions without player fixed effects, we find an inverted U-shape relationship
between most output measures and age.
26In some cases players can legally change nationality. Formerly Brazilian player Deco’s adopted Por-
tuguese citizenship for example, mainly to participate in the Euro 2004 and World Cup 2006. Authorities
and the FIFA have a critical attitude to such steps, however, which are therefore very rare. Nationality
changes by players who grew up in a country other than their country of origin, such as Ghanaian-born
Gerald Asamoah who adopted German citizenship, are naturally more common.
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group of Europeans, the assignment of the treatment, i.e., a nation’s qualification, should
depend on the skills of players who participated in the qualification matches, so for some
European players selection into the treatment is not completely random at this stage;
however, even if some players’ outputs are indeed positively correlated with treatment
status, it seems reasonable to assume these are no longer correlated once we control for
constant skill/output differences between players by means of player fixed effects.
Our differences-in-differences analysis is based on the underlying assumption that de
facto qualification dates are relevant for determining the beginning of the treatment for
Euro 2008 - Europeans. One may argue though that even earlier on players from coun-
tries likely to qualify already exerted additional effort to increase their individual nom-
ination chances. We believe that our analysis is pertinent nonetheless. On the de facto
qualification date, there is a discrete upward jump in qualification probability (to 1) for
qualified nations, associated with a permanent increase in treatment intensity.27 The the-
ory predicts a positive reaction to such a permanent discrete change even if players were
already concerned with the nomination contest previously. In principle, we could esti-
mate pre-qualification treatment intensities combining the outcomes of completed qual-
ifications matches with national team ratings that determine winning probabilities for
upcoming qualification matches. A difficulty when using such intensities would be that
once we consider a longer time horizon, discounting, an issue we neglect in the present
analysis,28 should be quite important. Finally, it is unlikely that knowing more about
pre-qualification treatment intensities would allow us to yield additional insights concern-
ing what will be our main interest, the comparison of effects on players with different
characteristics.
As mentioned in the introduction, there are several possible explanations for why
an upcoming international Cup may have affect the outputs of players from qualified
nations. In order to discriminate between the nomination contest theory and alternative
explanations, we construct, as a proxy for player i’s anticipated nomination chance, the
following time-varying variable in [0, 1] measuring i’s national team exposure since World
27Similarly, for all non-qualified nations there is a downward jump to zero at some point in time, in
many cases already long before the official qualification date. The group of players from these nations in
our sample is somewhat small (n = 23) to identify significant effects. Most Europeans from non-qualified
nations are from nations highly unlikely to participate in a Euro Cup; in particular, our sample contains
no players from England, a nation that was expected to qualify but in the end failed.
28Testing for trends in the reaction to the Euro Cup treatment revealed no clear picture.
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Cup 2006 (WC06):
natteamit =
number of i’s national team appearances since WC06
number of national team matches of i’s nation since WC06
National team matches include friendly matches as well as qualification matches for
the Euro 2008 or other international tournaments. In the sample containing all players
active both in 06/07 and 07/08 (and after Nov. 07), natteamit = 0 at all dates t for 109
out of the 165 players of Euro 2008 nationalities, and for 20 of the 81 players of other
nationalities. Figure 4 depicts the distribution of natteamit for players of Euro 2008
nationalities in the 07/08 season, conditional on natteamit > 0. The Figure shows much
variation in natteamit for those players with some national team exposure since World
Cup 2006.29
Table 9 in Appendix 2 shows that the values of natteam at the time of final nomination
decisions (at the end of the 07/08 season) are closely related to the actual nominations
for the Euro 2008 German national team. For all other Euro 2008 nationalities, the
player(s) in our sample with the highest end of season values of natteam were nominated,
i.e., nomination decisions were perfectly in line with the rankings of final natteam values.
The nomination contest theory predicts a non-monotonic effect of natteamit on the
effort of players from Euro 2008 nations during the nomination contest period. Players
who believe they will be nominated with an intermediate probability should exert high
effort to convince the national coach of their skill. Players with natteamit close to 0
or 1, on the other hand, expecting that small performance changes will not affect the
national coach’s decision, should not alter their effort much or at all. To capture the
uncertainty of a player’s nomination we construct the variable natteamit (1− natteamit);
the nomination contest theory predicts strong effects for high natteamit (1− natteamit),
and no effect for natteamit (1− natteamit) = 0.
The ‘training theory’ instead predicts higher output the higher natteam. Ceteris
paribus, a player who thinks he will be nominated with a higher probability has more to
gain from increasing his training intensity to be in good shape for the Cup. Moreover,
players with high natteam may receive more (or different) training at the national team
level. The ‘injury theory’, on the other hand, predicts lower club output the higher
natteamit, because players who expect to be on the national team have a higher incentive
to avoid injuries in the months before the Cup, which could adversely affect their output.
29The total number of national team matches was similar for the treatment and the control group, and
the analogue to Figure 4 for players in the control looks similar.
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Figure 4: Histogram of natteamit for players from Euro 2008 nations in season 07/08, condi-
tional on natteamit> 0. The sample excludes goalkeepers, and players of Austrians or Swiss
nationality. The number of players is 56, and the number of player-gameday observations 1478.
Of course, several of these theories may matter at the same time; for instance, a player with
an intermediate nomination chance may increase training intensity with two objectives in
mind: improving his nomination chance, and, conditional on being nominated, performing
well in the Cup.
To discriminate between these di¤erent theories, we estimate the following di¤erences-
in-di¤erences-in-di¤erences regression equation:
Yint = t + i + 0qualifiednt
+ 1qualifiedntnatteamit + 2qualifiedntnatteamit (1  natteamit)
+ 1natteamit + 2natteamit (1  natteamit)
+ 1euronnatteamit + 2euronnatteamit (1  natteamit)
+ 1aftertnatteamit + 2aftertnatteamit (1  natteamit)
+X 0int + "int:
(9)
All three theories predict that 0, the e¤ect on players from Euro 2008 nations who have
no realistic chance of being nominated, should be zero. The nomination contest theory
moreover predicts a positive coe¢ cient 2. The training theorypredicts a positive 1,
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Figure 4: Histogram of natteamit for players from Euro 2008 nations in season 07/08, condi-
tional on natteamit> 0. The sample excludes goalkeepers, and players of Austrians or Swiss
nationality. The number of players is 56, and the number of player-gameday observations 1478.
Of course, several of these theories may matter at the same time; for instance, a player with
an intermediate nomination chance may increase training intensity with two objectives in
mind: improving his nomination chance, and, conditional on being nominated, performing
well in the Cup.
To discriminate between these different theories, we estimate the following differences-
in-differences-in-diff rences regr ss on quation:
Yint = αt + γi + δ0qualifiednt
+ δ1qualifiedntnatteamit + δ2qualifiedntnatteamit (1− natteamit)
+ η1n tteamit + η2n tteamit (1− natteamit)
+ ρ1euronnatteamit + ρ2euronnatteamit (1− natteamit)
+ pi1aftertnatteamit + pi2aftertnatteamit (1− natteamit)
+X ′intβ + εint.
(9)
All three theories predict that δ0, the effect on players from Euro 2008 nations who have
no realistic chance of being nominated, should be zero. The nomination contest theory
moreover predicts a positive coefficient δ2. The ‘training theory’ predicts a positive δ1,
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but the ‘injury theory’ a negative δ1.
The covariates natteamit and natteamit (1− natteamit) also enter the regression equa-
tions interacted with the variable euron, indicating whether n is a Euro 2008 participant,
and aftert, which indicates the time period after the official qualification date (November
21, 2007). These interactions are introduced to make sure that the estimates of δ1 and δ2
capture the effect of national team exposure in combination with Cup qualification rather
than differential effects for different nationalities or in different time periods.
We see two main reasons why natteamit may affect player performance even in the
absence of concerns related to participation in an international Cup. On the one hand,
playing for the national team may wear out a player, but on the other hand, the national
team may provide a player with additional training or experience useful for his club
matches. When using natteamit as an explanatory variable, however, we face the following
potential problem: although we control for time-invariant quality differences between
players, both natteamit and Yit may be driven by unobservable variation in i’s ability
(temporary ups and downs in his physical shape for example). What makes the problem
less severe conceptually is that natteamit is based on past observations, while Yit depends
only on the current shape of the player. The results in the next section indicate that we
have no such simultaneity problem: the estimated coefficient of natteamit turns out to be
insignificant in all regressions.
Another prediction of the nomination contest theory is that the precision about a
player’s ability should affect his effort to win the contest. Roughly speaking, the incentive
effect should be low for both very unknown players and well-known players, but high for
players about whom the national trainer has some yet limited information (see Figure 2
for this in an example). However, we would expect a decreasing relationship if there is
sufficient information about all professional soccer players so that the area of precision
close to zero in the theory can be ignored. In addition, post Euro Cup career concerns
should be stronger for less known players, which implies that those players should have a
higher incentive to make it into the national team.
We use age as a proxy for the precision of beliefs about a player’s ability. A possible
alternative measure would be seniority, a good measure of which would probably be the
number of years a player has played in one of the top soccer leagues (essentially the Italian,
English, Spanish, French, and German leagues).30 We decided to use age instead, since
30Using a player’s seniority in the German league alone would not be very meaningful, since players
often move between different leagues, and the number of years played in the German league does not
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Figure 5: Distribution of age (on May 17, 2008) of players from nations that qualied for the
Euro 2008. The sample excludes goalkeepers, and Austrian or Swiss players. The number of
players is 165.
this information is more readily available, and the starting age for a professional career
in soccer, as in most other sports, does not seem to di¤er much across players. Figure 5
shows the distribution of age for players in the treatment group.
The basic regression equation we will use to test for di¤erential e¤ects as a function
of age is
Yint = t + i + 0qualifiednt + 1qualifiednt (agei   agei)
+ 1aftert (agei   agei) +X 0int + "int;
(10)
where an upper bar denotes the mean over players in the treatment group. To capture the
possible non-monotonicity predicted by the nomination contest theory, we also estimated
regressions including interactions terms with the (demeaned) square function of agei and
other more complex functions, or dummies for di¤erent age groups based on percentiles
of the age distribution. None of these analyses yielded signicant results, however, which
is why we will focus on the results obtained using a simple linear interaction term as
in (10). The coe¢ cient 0 estimates the treatment e¤ect for a treated player of average
age, while 1 tests for di¤erential e¤ects by age. Since the regression equations already
seem relevant for determining how well, say, Italys national coach knows an Italian player.
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Figure 5: Distribution of age (on May 17, 2008) of players from nations that qualified for the
Euro 2008. The sample excludes goalkeepers, and Austrian or Swiss players. The number of
players is 165.
this information is more readily available, and the starting age for a professional career
in soccer, as in most other sports, does not seem to differ much across players. Figure 5
shows the distribution of age for players in the treatment group.
The basic regression equation we will use to test for differential effects as a function
of age is
Yint = αt + γi + δ0qualifiednt + δ1qualifiednt (agei − agei)
+ µ1aftert (agei − agei) +X ′intβ + εint,
(10)
where an upper bar denotes the mean over players in the treatment group. To capture the
possible non-monoto icity pr dicted by the nomination contest theory, we also estimated
regressions including in eractions terms with the (demeaned) quare function f agei and
other more omplex functions, or dummies for diff rent age gro ps based percentiles
of the age distribution. N e of these analyses yielded significant result , however, which
is why we will focus on the results obtained using a simple linear in eraction term as
in (10). The coefficient δ0 estimates the treatme t effect for a tre ted player f average
age, while δ1 tests for differential effects by age. Since the regression equations already
seem relevant for determining how well, say, Italy’s national coach knows an Italian player.
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includes player fixed effects, we do not include separate age covariates, or interactions
between euron and the age variables. The interactions with aftert pick up any particular
relationship between age and output after the qualification date but not specific to players
from qualified nations.
Because our data on minutes played take on nonnegative integer values (between 0 and
96), a count model is appropriate for regressions with minutes played as the dependent
variable; we will use the negative binomial model, since the Poisson model is rejected at
high degrees of confidence.31 For all other dependent variables, which are outputs (shots
on goal,...) per minute played and hence continuous, we use OLS estimation. While all the
stated regression equations in principle allow error terms to depend on n, within-group
correlations at the nationality level are low.32 This is not surprising, since as already
argued it is difficult to come up with any reason - unrelated to the national team - for
why nationality should matter in an established player’s professional life. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the individual player level so as to take into account serial
correlation, which could be due for example to injuries.33
5 Results
5.1 Average Effects
Before turning to the regression results, we present graphical evidence of trends in the
raw data. Figure 6 tracks the average numbers of minutes played per match of players in
the treatment group, i.e., of Euro 2008 nationalities, and the control group comprising
all other nationalities. For each season and each group the Figure includes a fitted linear
trend, with a 95% confidence interval around it. The two vertical lines indicate the period
during which nations, other than the host countries Austria and Switzerland, de facto
qualified for the Euro 2008. The data exhibit a clear positive trend for players of Euro
31Allison and Waterman (2002) as well as Guimara˜es (2008) show that for the negative binomial model
the estimator proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) is a conditional fixed effects estimator under very
specific assumptions only. As suggested by Allison and Waterman (2002), player fixed effects can be
included by means player dummies, however, which is the approach we follow.
32For all the output measures we use, the intraclass correlation if class is nationality lies below 0.1, in
many cases even below 0.05.
33If class is player identity, the intraclass correlations for the various output measures we empoy lie
between 0.2 and 0.4.
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Figure 6: Development of the average number of minutes played (per match) for Euro 2008 -
Europeans and players of other nationalities. All observations except those of goalkeepers, and
Austrian or Swiss nationals are included.
2008 nationalities and an associated negative trend for players from other nations.34 This
development is apparent in both seasons but considerably stronger in the 07/08 season,
when players in the treatment group also overtake players in the control group.
Figure 7 shows the evolutions of the average numbers of goals per match of players
in the treatment group and the control group. Figure 8 tracks the developments of goals
per minute played for observations associated with more than 71 minutes on the eld, the
threshold used for the regression analyses with per minute output measures as dependent
variables. As before, each Figure includes linear tted trends in each season, and vertical
lines indicating the period of nal qualication decisions.
Figure 7 shows that the average number of goals per match increased for both groups
over the course of the 06/07 season. The two trend lines are approximately parallel
although, as illustrated in Figure 6, players in the treatment group on average gained
minutes relative to players in the control group. In the 07/08 season preceding the Euro
2008, on the other hand, players in the treatment group dramatically improved relative
34We will discuss substitution e¤ects between di¤erent subgroups of player, which suggest that such
opposite trends are natural, in more detail below.
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Figure 6: Development of the average number of minutes played (per match) for Euro 2008 -
Europeans and players of other nationalities. All observations except those of goalkeepers, and
Austrian or Swiss nationals are included.
2008 nationalities and an associated negative trend for players from other nations.34 This
development is apparent in both seasons but considerably stronger in the 07/08 season,
when players in the treatment group also overtake players in the control group.
Figure 7 shows the evolutions of the average numbers of goals per match of players
in the treatment group and the control group. Figure 8 tracks the developments of goals
per minute played for observations associated with more than 71 minutes on the field, the
threshold used for the regressio analyses with per minute output measures as dependent
variables. As before, each Figure includes linear fitted tr nds in each season, and vertical
lines indicating th period of final q alification decisions.
Figure 7 shows that the average number of goal per match increased for both groups
over the course of the 06/07 season. The tw trend lines are approximately parallel
although, as illustrated in Figure 6, players in the treatment grou n average gained
minutes relative to players in the control group. In the 07/08 season preceding the Euro
2008, on the other hand, players in the treatment group dramatically improved relative
34We will discuss substitution effects between different subgroups of player, which suggest that such
opposite trends are natural, in more detail below.
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Figure 7: Development of the average numbers of goals shot (per match) for Euro 2008 -
Europeans and players of other nationalities. All observations except those of goalkeepers, and
Austrian or Swiss nationals are included.
Figure 8: Development of the average numbers of goals shot per minute played for Euro 2008 -
Europeans and players of other nationalities. All observations associated with more than 71
minutes played, except those of goalkeepers, and Austrian or Swiss nationals, are included.
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Figure 7: Development of the average numbers of goals shot (per match) for Euro 2008 -
Europeans and players of other nationalities. All observations except those of goalkeepers, and
Austrian or Swiss nationals are included.
Figure 7: Development of the average numbers of goals shot (per match) for Euro 2008 -
Europeans and players of other nationalities. All observations except those of goalkeepers, and
Austrian or Swiss nationals are included.
Figure 8: Development of the average numbers of goals shot per minute played for Euro 2008 -
Europeans and players of other nationalities. All observations associated with more than 71
minutes played, except those of goalkeepers, and Austrian or Swiss nationals, are included.
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Figure 8: Development of the average numbers of goals shot per minute played for Euro 2008 -
Europeans and players of other nationalities. All observations associated with more than 71
minutes played, except those of goalkeepers, and Austrian or Swiss nationals, are included.
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to players in the control group.
Figure 8 illustrates that once we consider the average number of goals per minute
played, players in the control group even slightly improved relative to players in the
treatment group in the 06/07 season. In the 07/08 season, on the other hand, players of
Euro 2008 nationalities again improved substantially over the course of the season, while
the goal-shooting performance of players of other nationalities worsened.
It is useful to note that for some output measures, minutes played most notably
but also measures like passes received per minute, there is a substitution effect between
different players. Since the length of each match is limited and there is only one ball
in the game, not all players can simultaneously be on the field or play the ball. If the
average number of minutes played of a subset of players goes up, we would therefore
expect the average number of minutes played of the remaining players to decrease for
example.35 Indeed, the correlation between the minutes played observations of players in
the control group and those of players in the treatment group is about −0.55. For other
output measures, such as shots on goal per minute, the correlation is much closer to zero
but remains negative. We will come back to this when interpreting some of the regression
results.
In spite of the apparent trends in Figures 6 to 8, the regression results in Tables
5 and 6 provide only very weak support for the hypothesis that on average Euro Cup
qualification positively affected the club match outputs of players from qualified nations.
For minutes played, the estimated coefficient of qualified is positive but insignificant, as
reported column 1 of Table 5. For the various output per minute measures we employ,
Table 6 shows that again we find only weak support for an average effect of the Euro Cup
treatment. For shots on goal per minute played, the effect is insignificant in the sample
including observations for all field positions, but significant once only observations of
forward players are considered. In the latter case, the effect is about 0.00680 shots on
goal per minutes, which corresponds to a 21% increase in the number of shots on goal per
minute for forward players in the treatment group. We also do not find any significant
effects of qualified on the other reported output measures in regression including all field
positions.
35One needs to be careful with too quick conclusions however. First, in the full sample the proportions of
players from the two different groups need not be constant over time. Second, if we keep the proportions
of player from different groups constant by excluding players who are active for a subperiod only (a
balanced panel), then minutes can be lost to or gained from players outside of the sample.
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Table 5: Regression results for minutes played
VARIABLES
Minutes played
(1) (2) (3) (4)
qualified 0.061 0.057 0.042 0.041
(0.062) (0.088) (0.062) (0.086)
qualified ∗ natteam -0.621*** -0.586***
(0.200) (0.201)
qualified ∗ natteam(1− natteam) 1.512** 1.394**
(0.646) (0.652)
qualified ∗ (age− age) -0.012 -0.010
(0.016) (0.016)
forward -0.510*** -0.513*** -0.511*** -0.515***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130)
midfield -0.328*** -0.329*** -0.331*** -0.332***
(0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
natteam 0.176 0.165
(0.109) (0.107)
natteam(1− natteam) -0.116 -0.129
(0.353) (0.351)
after ∗ natteam 0.620*** 0.628***
(0.169) (0.172)
after ∗ natteam(1− natteam) -1.074* -1.065*
(0.588) (0.588)
euro ∗ natteam -0.251* -0.265*
(0.145) (0.143)
euro ∗ natteam(1− natteam) 0.121 0.086
(0.376) (0.375)
after ∗ (age− age) -0.005 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012)
Gameday dummies YES YES YES YES
Club dummies YES YES YES YES
Opponent dummies YES YES YES YES
Player fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Constant 5.181*** 5.142*** 5.278*** 5.231***
(0.583) (0.569) (0.569) (0.553)
Observations 11821 11821 11821 11821
Notes: The table reports negative binomial regression estimates. Values between parentheses are robust standard er-
rors clustered at the player level. Only observations from players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss
are included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08 season, and
before and after 21 Nov 2007, and with at least one strictly positive observation of minutes played in the two seasons.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Differences-in-differences regression results for outputs per minute played
VARIABLES
per minute played
shots goals passes ball duels cross shots cross
on goal received contacts won passes on goal passes
(only forwards) (only forwards)
qualified 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0094 -0.0138 -0.0023 0.0006 0.0068 ** 0.0047 *
(0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0091) (0.0110) (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0025)
homegame 0.0035***0.0004*** 0.0295*** 0.0373*** 0.0048*** 0.0038*** 0.0062 *** 0.0054 ***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0010)
forward 0.0080***0.0017***-0.0115 -0.1220*** 0.0088* -0.0033
(0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0125) (0.0199) (0.0052) (0.0024)
midfield 0.0071***0.0009*** 0.0067 -0.0841*** 0.0099***-0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0102) (0.0173) (0.0037) (0.0014)
Gameday YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Club YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Opponent YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Player FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.0165***0.0611*** 0.0044** 0.311*** 0.723*** 0.113*** -0.0144 *** 0.0214 ***
(0.0026) (0.0135) (0.0018) (0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0135) (0.0038) (0.0049)
Obs. 7104 6389 7107 7107 7107 6785 1052 1051
R2 0.443 0.156 0.491 0.546 0.297 0.415 0.273 0.375
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. Values between parentheses are robust standard errors clus-
tered at the player level. Only observations associated with more than 71 minutes played and of players
who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included. Moreover, the sample includes only
players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and
with at least one strictly positive observation of the respective dependent variable in these two seasons.
The last two columns contain results for observations of players on forward positions only.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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The fact that the majority of players in the treatment group never played for the
national team before suggests that many players in the treatment group know they have
no realistic chance of playing in the Euro 2008. This seems a likely explanation for the
absence of any significant average effect of the Euro treatment.
5.2 Differential Effects: Nomination Chance and Age
Table 7 reports results of regressions concerned with differential effects as a function of
a player’s nomination chance, as proxied by his national team participations since the
last World Cup. The estimates for shots on goal per minute reported in the first column
of Table 7 supports the prediction of the nomination contest theory that players with
uncertain nomination chances should react most strongly. The coefficient of qualified ∗
natteam(1− natteam) is positive and significant at the 5% level, while the direct effects
of qualified and all other regressors that involve natteam are insignificant. Interpreting
natteam as a player’s current nomination probability, the prediction is a symmetric inverse
U-shaped relationship between a player’s national team nomination probability and the
effect of his nation’s Euro Cup qualification on his club match output. For players with
nomination probabilities around 50% the predicted size of the effect is maximal and
equals about 0.00605; this corresponds to 27% of average pre-treatment shots on goal
per minute for players in the treatment group with natteam-values between 0.4 and 0.6.
The coefficients of the homegame, forward and midfield dummies are all positive, as
expected, and highly significant.
For goals per minute, the coefficient of qualified ∗ natteam(1 − natteam) is positive
again but insignificant. There is some evidence, however, that uncertainty about being a
regular player on the national team affected Euro Cup 2008 - nationals differently than
other players: while the coefficient of euro ∗ natteam(1 − natteam) is positive, that of
natteam(1 − natteam) is negative. A possible explanation would be that even prior to
the de facto qualifications for the Euro 2008, forward players from likely Cup participants
already started competing for the rare spots on their national teams.
The results for passes received and ball contacts confirm the predictions of both the
nomination contest and the injury theory. For both output measures, the estimated
impact of the Euro Cup treatment is positive for players with intermediate values of
natteam, but negative for players with natteam close to 1. Overall, the results in Table
7 provide a coherent picture in support of the nomination contest and the injury theory:
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although the relevant coefficients lack significance for some of the output measures, the
signs of the relevant coefficients in all the regressions are in line with these two theories.
For minutes played, negative binomial regression results are reported in column 2 of
Table 5.36 The coefficient of qualified ∗ natteam(1− natteam) is positive and significant
at the 5% level. The coefficient of qualified ∗ natteam is negative and significant at the
1% level. Interestingly, the interactions of natteam and natteam(1− natteam) with the
variable after that indicates the treatment period are significant as well, but have the
opposite signs of the interactions with qualified. We interpret this as a consequence
of the substitution effect between different player groups described above: for the total
number of minutes to remain constant, some players in the treatment group must be
affected. Our results suggest that the impact on players in the control group depends on
their ability which in turn is correlated with natteam; teams seem to substitute minutes
between players in treatment and the control group of roughly similar abilities.
Given the non-linear nature of the estimator, marginal effects depend on the values of
all variables, and interpreting interaction terms is more difficult than before. The ratio of
the marginal effects of any two regressors are constant, however, and equal to the ratio of
the estimated coefficients. This property permits us to evaluate the sign of the impact of
the Euro Cup treatment on a player, given his value of natteam. The relative sizes of the
estimated coefficients of qualified∗natteam and qualified∗natteam(1−natteam) imply
that if 0 < natteam < 0.59 then the effect of the Euro Cup treatment is positive, but it
is negative for higher values of natteam. Hence, the results again confirm the nomination
contest theory as well as the injury theory.
Table 8 reports results of regressions on output per minute played that test for dif-
ferential treatment effects depending on age. For several output measures, we find that
ceteris paribus the treatment effect is stronger the younger a player, and that the av-
erage effect is positive for players of below-average age but negative for older players.
For minutes played, reported in the third column of Table 5, the estimated coefficient is
again negative but insignificant. Results of regressions using age dummies for different
percentiles of the age distribution instead of the (demeaned) age variable exhibit similar
patterns: the effect is weaker and often even negative for older players than for younger
players. We found no consistent evidence of a stronger effect for players of median age as
compared to the youngest players, as the theoretical results illustrated in Figure 2 would
36OLS estimates of the same regression equations with ln (minutes played + 1) as the dependent vari-
able are qualitatively similar.
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Table 7: Regression results: differential effects by past national team exposure
VARIABLES
per minute played
shots goals passes ball duels cross
on goal received contacts won passes
qualified -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0180 -0.0230 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0123) (0.0163) (0.0040) (0.0015)
qualified ∗ natteam -0.0053 -0.0014 -0.0936** -0.1070** -0.0167* -0.0039
(0.0037) (0.0010) (0.0430) (0.0535) (0.0093) (0.0039)
qualified ∗ natteam(1− natteam) 0.0242** 0.0005 0.3300*** 0.3710*** 0.0082 0.0107
(0.0119) (0.0037) (0.1140) (0.1400) (0.0349) (0.0117)
homegame 0.0035*** 0.0004*** 0.0296*** 0.0374*** 0.0048*** 0.0038***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0011) (0.0004)
forward 0.0082*** 0.0016***-0.0101 -0.1200*** 0.0088* -0.0033
(0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0124) (0.0198) (0.0052) (0.0024)
midfield 0.0071*** 0.0008*** 0.0064 -0.0843*** 0.0100***-0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0102) (0.0174) (0.0037) (0.0014)
natteam 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0045 0.0071 -0.0020 -0.0007
(0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0198) (0.0230) (0.0057) (0.0017)
natteam(1− natteam) 0.0045 -0.0032* 0.0705 0.0899 -0.0163 0.0056
(0.0056) (0.0019) (0.0538) (0.0654) (0.0174) (0.0059)
after ∗ natteam -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0407 0.0501 0.0045 0.0032
(0.0031) (0.0008) (0.0273) (0.0351) (0.0081) (0.0032)
after ∗ natteam(1− natteam) -0.0022 0.0033 -0.1630* -0.2050* 0.0074 -0.0126
(0.0090) (0.0025) (0.0847) (0.1050) (0.0291) (0.0093)
euro ∗ natteam 0.0023 -0.0003 0.0580** 0.0667** 0.0053 0.0028
(0.0028) (0.0008) (0.0267) (0.0325) (0.0086) (0.0032)
euro ∗ natteam(1− natteam) -0.0047 0.0041* -0.0726 -0.0947 0.0106 -0.0084
(0.0070) (0.0024) (0.0654) (0.0884) (0.0247) (0.0095)
Gameday dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Club dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Opponent dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Player fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.0165*** 0.0043** 0.315*** 0.731*** 0.113***-0.0141***
(0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0327) (0.0307) (0.0130) (0.0040)
Observations 7104 6389 7107 7107 7107 6785
R2 0.444 0.157 0.493 0.548 0.298 0.416
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. Values between parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations
associated with more than 71 minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are included. Moreover, the sam-
ple includes only players who were active in both the 06/07 and the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly
positive observation of the respective dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 8: Regression results: differential effects by age
VARIABLES
per minute played
shots goals passes ball duels cross
on goal received contacts won passes
qualified -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0053 -0.0094 -0.0017 0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0091) (0.0112) (0.0026) (0.0010)
qualified ∗ (age− age) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0055***-0.0066***-0.0005 -0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0006) (0.0002)
homegame 0.0035*** 0.0004*** 0.0295*** 0.0373*** 0.0048*** 0.0038***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0011) (0.0004)
forward 0.0080*** 0.0016***-0.0118 -0.1220*** 0.0089* -0.0034
(0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0123) (0.0196) (0.0052) (0.0024)
midfield 0.0071*** 0.0008*** 0.0046 -0.0869*** 0.0098***-0.0011
(0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0100) (0.0170) (0.0037) (0.0014)
after ∗ (age− age) -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0010 0.0005 0.0003 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Gameday dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Club dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Opponent dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Player fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.0165*** 0.0044** 0.3100*** 0.7210*** 0.1130***-0.0145***
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0314) (0.0283) (0.0134) (0.0038)
Observations 7104 6389 7107 7107 7107 6785
R2 0.443 0.156 0.493 0.547 0.297 0.416
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. Values between parentheses are robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the player level. Only observations associated with more than
71 minutes played and of players who are neither goalkeepers nor Austrian or Swiss are
included. Moreover, the sample includes only players who were active in both the 06/07
and the 07/08 season (before and after 21 Nov 2007), and with at least one strictly pos-
itive observation of the respective dependent variable in these two seasons.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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suggest.
One may worry that the results of the regressions with age interactions (or natteam
interactions) could be driven by an underlying relationship between age and nomination
chance. We therefore also ran regressions including interactions with natteam as in (9)
and age interactions as in (10). The qualitative results concerning both interactions
remained unchanged; see the last column of Table 5 for this when minutes played is the
dependent variable.
Results are also be similar to those in Table 8 if we include only observations with
natteamit > 0, thereby restricting the treatment group to players with a realistic nomi-
nation chance. For passes received per minute as the dependent variable, the coefficient
of qualified ∗ (age− age) would be −0.0082 in that case (p-value = 0.011), and for ball
contacts per minute −0.0114 (p-value < 0.001). For both output measures, the effect
is hence stronger once players with no national team experience are excluded. Ideally,
we would like to investigate the effect of age for different nomination chances in more
detail, but unfortunately our data contains a too limited number of treated players with
a national team history for this.
To summarize our findings on the differential effects of the Euro Cup treatment:
1. Players from qualified countries with intermediate national team nomination chances
perform better in club matches (relative to players of other nationalities with similar
national team experience) after their nations’ qualifications for the Euro 2008 than
before.
2. Players from qualified countries with very high national team nomination chances
perform worse in club matches (relative to players of other nationalities with similar
national team experience) after their nations’ qualifications for the Euro 2008 than
before.
3. Along some dimensions, young players from qualified countries perform better in
club matches (relative to players of similar age from other nations) after their na-
tions’ qualifications for the Euro 2008 than before, but old players from qualified
countries perform worse in club matches (relative to players of similar age from
other nations) after their nations’ qualifications for the Euro 2008 than before.
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6 Conclusion
Tournament-style rivalry between agents, whether based on specified performance criteria
or perceived talent and ability as in the nomination contests for national soccer teams,
arises in many contexts. Firms often explicitly choose relative performance evaluation
schemes akin to tournaments in order to provide incentives to employees. In other situ-
ations, the principal’s only goal is to select the most suitable agent, but this may create
similar incentives. In both cases, economic theory predicts that agents should exert higher
effort the closer the race. This paper provides empirical evidence for this prediction. We
show that players from nations qualified for the Euro 2008 who had been called upon
by the national coach in some but not too many recent national team matches improved
their performance, relative to players of other nationalities with a similar standing in
their national teams, after their countries’ qualifications. For players without any recent
national team nominations, on the other hand, there is no evidence of any improvement
relative to players of other nationalities.
Moreover, our evidence suggests that players who were already quite certain of their
Euro Cup participations actually performed worse along several dimensions than they
would have in the absence of the upcoming Cup. The likely cause is that these players
want to avoid injuries and more generally preserve their strength and fitness for the Cup.
Hence, while the clubs often benefit from the national team nomination contests, they
may actually suffer losses in the case of top players. Similar effects can occur in other
situations where agents compete for a position that requires effort in the future instead
of for a monetary prize. Consider promotion contests in firms for example. An employee
who expects an almost certain promotion into a different unit may be inclined to work
less hard in his current position not only because of ”last-round” effects but also because
the employee wants to preserve energy for his/her new position. Such behavior clearly
inflicts a loss on the employee’s current unit.
Finally, this paper adds to the empirical literature testing the predictions of career
concerns models by providing evidence that the effect of the Euro 2008 qualification on
individual performance was stronger for younger players than for older players. There
are two possible theoretical explanations for this. First, the national coach may have a
less firmly established opinion of younger players than of older player, who may therefore
have greater chances of influencing the coach’s decision by their performances. Second,
post Euro Cup career concerns may be more important for younger players, who hence
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have more to gain from being nominated.
A number of issues remain open for future research. First, we were not able to find
any evidence for the theoretical prediction of our nomination contest theory that effort is
increasing in information precision when little is known about the agent’s ability at the
outset. This may be either because no such effect exists here, or because the data do not
contain sufficiently many observations of young players with a realistic nomination chance
to test the prediction satisfactorily. We hope that adding data from other European soccer
leagues will help us to illuminate this question further.
Second, another interesting question is whether the Euro Cup treatment affects not
only mean performance but also style of play, in particular whether players adopt more
creative or riskier strategies. A preliminary investigation of our data suggests that players
with an intermediate nomination chance adopt riskier strategies, as measured by the
variance of output during the nomination period, than players with a very low or high
nomination chance.
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A Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us denote by σ (hj, hk, hε), equal to the square root of σ
2
defined in (4), the standard deviation of the distributions ϕ1 (·) and ϕ2 (·). Making use
of the normality of ϕj (·), the first-order condition defining a∗j can then be rewritten as
1√
2piσ (hj, hk, hε)
exp
(
− (mk −mj)
2
2σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
hε
hj + hε
Wj = c
′ (a∗j) , (11)
which is equivalent to
1√
2piσ (hj, hk, hε)
exp
(
− |mk −mj|
2
2σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
hε
hj + hε
Wj = c
′ (a∗j) , (12)
which depends on ∆ ≡ |m1 −m2| but not on m1 and m2 individually.
Applying the implicit function theorem yields
da∗j
d∆
= ϕj (0)
( −2∆
2σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
) hε
hj+hε
Wj
c′′
(
a∗j
) . (13)
Since c′′ > 0, (13) implies that
da∗j
d∆
< 0 if ∆ > 0, and
da∗j
d∆
= 0 if ∆ = 0.
Next, we consider the impact of a change in hj on a
∗
j . Applying the implicit function
theorem to (11) and rearranging terms yields
da∗j
dhj
=
exp
(
− (mk−mj)2
2σ2(hj ,hk,hε)
)
√
2piσ (hj, hk, hε)
Wj
hε
hj+hε
c′′
(
a∗j
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(14)
×
− ∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)∂hjσ (hj, hk, hε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1− (mk −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
− 1
hj + hε︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 . (15)
It is easy to see from (4) that
∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)
∂hj
< 0. This implies that whenever (mk −mj)2 ≥
σ2 (hj, hk, hε), then
da∗j
dhj
< 0. However, the sign of
da∗j
dhj
is ambiguous if (mk −mj)2 <
σ2 (hj, hk, hε). This inequality always holds ifmk = mj; moreover, since limhj→0 σ (hj, hk, hε) =
∞, it also always holds for hj close enough to 0, even if the difference between mk and
mj is large.
Lemma A1 below tells us that limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
=∞. Moreover, since limhj→∞ ∂P (aj ,a
∗
k)
∂aj
= 0,
we have limhj→∞
da∗j
dhj
= 0.37 Given continuity, this implies that
da∗j
dhj
< 0 for some hj. It
remains to show that there exists a unique ĥj, such that
da∗j
dhj
> 0 if and only if hj < ĥj.
37An interior solution exists for arbitrarily large hj if c′(0) = 0. Otherwise, for all hj bexond a certain
threshold, j’s profit maximization problem has the corner solution a∗j = 0.
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Since c′′ > 0,
da∗j
dhj
has the sign of the sum between square brackets in (14). Using the
expression for σ in (4) and simplifying we find that
−
∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)
∂hj
σ (hj, hk, hε)
(
1− (mk −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
− 1
hj + hε
=
hk (2hj + hε) (hk + hε)
(
1− (mk−mj)2
σ2(hj ,hk,hε)
)
− 2hj [hj (hj + hε) + hk (hk + hε)]
2hj (hj + hε) [hj (hj + hε) + hk (hk + hε)]
. (16)
da∗j
dhj
has the same sign as the numerator in (16). The partial derivative of the numerator
in (16) with respect to hj is
− 2hk (hk + hε) (mk −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
+ hk (2hj + hε) (hk + hε)
(mk −mj)2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
∂σ2
∂hj︸︷︷︸
<0
− 2hj (hj + hε)− 2hj (2hj + hε) ,
which is clearly negative. Since limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
= ∞ and limhj→∞
da∗j
dhj
= 0, it follows from
this that given the other parameters there exists a unique ĥj > 0 such that
da∗j
dhj
R 0 if and
only if hj S ĥj.
Finally,
da∗j
dhk
=
exp
(
− (mk−mj)2
2σ2(hj ,hk,hε)
)
√
2piσ (hj, hk, hε)
Wj
hε
hj+hε
c′′
(
a∗j
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
−
∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)
∂hk
σ (hj, hk, hε)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1− (mk −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
. (17)
From (17) it is easy to see that
da∗j
dhk
> 0 if and only if (mk −mj)2 < σ2 (hj, hk, hε). Since
limhk→0 σ
2 = ∞ and σ2 (hj, hk, hε) is strictly decreasing in hk (see (4)), there exists a
unique threshold ĥk such that
da∗j
dhk
R 0 if and only if hk S ĥk. Observe that ĥk > ĥj.
Lemma 1 (Lemma A1) limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
=∞
Proof. First note that both limhj→0 σ = ∞ and limhj→0 ∂σ∂hj = ∞. To determine
limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
, we first simplify the limit of (14) as follows:
lim
hj→0
da∗j
dhj
=
limhj→0
{
exp
(
− (mk−mj)2
2σ2(hj ,hk,hε)
)}
√
2pi
Wj
hε
hj+hε
c′′
(
a∗j
)
×
 lim
hj→0
−
∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)
∂hj
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
 limhj→0
(
1− (mk −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
− lim
hj→0
(
1
(hj + hε)σ (hj, hk, hε)
)
=
Wj√
2pic′′
(
a∗j
) lim
hj→0
− ∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)∂hj
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
 .
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Using the expression for σ2 in (4) and simplifying leads to
−
∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)
∂hj
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
=
hε(2hj+hε)
2h2j (hj+hε)
2(
hε[hj(hj+hε)+hk(hk+hε)]
hjhk(hj+hε)(hk+hε)
) 3
2
.
Taking limits yields
lim
hj→0
hε(2hj+hε)
2h2j (hj+hε)
2(
hε[hj(hj+hε)+hk(hk+hε)]
hjhk(hj+hε)(hk+hε)
) 3
2
= lim
hj→0
1
2
(
hε
hj(hj+hε)
)2
(
hε
hj(hj+hε)
) 3
2
= lim
hj→0
1
2
(
hε
hj (hj + hε)
) 1
2
=∞.
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B Appendix 2: Additional Tables
Table 9: German Euro 2008 team nominations and values of natteam.
Bold letters indicate nominated players.
player
natteam
World Cup 06
end of 07/08 season two-year average
Thomas Hitzlsperger 80.00% 72.79% Yes
Bastian Schweinsteiger 70.00% 82.21% Yes
Arne Friedrich 70.00% 80.74% Yes
Philipp Lahm 70.00% 76.75% Yes
Lukas Podolski 70.00% 71.30% Yes
Marcell Jansen 65.00% 67.09% Yes
Torsten Frings 60.00% 86.72% Yes
Miroslav Klose 60.00% 65.27% Yes
Clemens Fritz 60.00% 48.40% -
Per Mertesacker 60.00% 31.93% Yes
Piotr Trochowski 55.00% 40.26% -
Kevin Kuranyi 55.00% 30.65% -
Bernd Schneider 50.00% 63.71% Yes
Manuel Friedrich 45.00% 68.56% -
Simon Rolfes 45.00% 20.03% -
Mario Gomez 45.00% 19.31% -
Roberto Hilbert 40.00% 19.01% -
Tim Borowski 25.00% 33.28% Yes
Mike Hanke 25.00% 30.66% Yes
Gonzalo Castro 25.00% 14.30% -
Marco Engelhardt 15.00% 22.82% -
Jan Schlaudraff 15.00% 18.60% -
Malik Fathi 10.53% 25.75% -
Gerald Asamoah 10.00% 18.89% Yes
Andreas Go¨rlitz 10.00% 16.49% -
Alexander Madlung 10.00% 13.34% -
Christian Pander 10.00% 5.09% -
Heiko Westermann 10.00% 1.87% -
Stefan Kießling 5.00% 4.24% -
Paul Freier 5.00% 4.09% -
Jermaine Jones 5.00% 2.04% -
Notes: The table includes all German players with positive average values of
natteam, except for goalkeepers. No German player without any national team
nominations during the sample period (i.e., with natteam = 0 at all times) was
nominated.
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